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Judicial Consideration of the Delegation of
Legislative Power to Regulatory Agencies
in the Progressive Era
JOHN H. GARVEY*
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Despite the vigorous debate which it occasioned in other circles,1 the
practice of delegating legislative power to regulatory agencies which
began at the end of the nineteenth century was never seriously question-
ed by American courts during the progressive era. This is not to say that
the judiciary saw no threat posed by government by institutions of a
form undreamed of at the time the Constitution was framed. Since the ap-
pearance of the first regulatory commissions, the courts have shown a
concern to protect individual rights which recently may be seen in the in-
sistence on procedural safeguards in agency adjudication and rule-
making which informs the Administrative Procedure Act.2 But the
judicial branch at the turn of the century was little troubled by the
absence of democratic input into the regulatory comnussion's rule-
making process, for the courts saw the same threat--subjection of in-
dividual rights to uncontrolled majority interests--posed by regulatory
comnussion and legislature alike. Judicial response consequently took
form not in a remand of non-delegable powers to the legislature, but in
the doctrines of the non-finality of administrative and legislative action,
and in efforts to narrow and define the constitutionally permissible scope
of such action.
Early Adminstrative Agencies
The regulatory agency of the late nineteenth century presented
democratic theory with delegation problems of a different magnitude
than those occasioned by earlier adminstrative agencies. Before the
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 3the administrative
concerns of the federal government were few, and involved little discre-
tion. Aside from the collection of tariffs, they centered about the distribu-
tion of national wealth and performance of public services: land sales and
grants, internal improvements, development of a merchant fleet and
coastal shipping, establishment of a postal system, and granting of
*A.B., 1970, Notre Dame; J.D., 1974, Harvard University. Assistant Professor of Law, University
of Kentucky.The substance of this article was originally submitted m partial fulfillment of the re-
quirements for a J.D. degree at Harvard University mn 1974.
'See, e.g., 40 CONG. REc. 3108-12 (1906) (remarks of Sen. Foraker) (Hepburn Act debates);
T.M. COOLEY. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 137-46 (6th ed. 1890); E. FREUND. AD-
MINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 14 (1928); R. CUSHMAN. THE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 428-33 (1941) (hereinafter cited as CUSHMAN).
25 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., 701 et seq., 3105 (1970).2Act of 4 Feb. 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
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patents and copyrights. 4 The states, closer to the frictions of everyday
life, began earlier than the federal government to regulate the actions of
their citizens. State police powers were exercised by boards charged with
enacting and enforcing sanitary codes and inspection laws, laying and
collecting assessments, and granting and withdrawing licenses to doc-
tors, pharmacists, and auctioneers. 5 Quite restrained by comparison with
the regulatory agencies established by the federal government in the
next century, these boards were concerned, for example, "[t]hat no cattle
be driven in the generally builtup portions of either of the cities of
New York or Brooklyn, except between the hours of nine of the evening
and one hour after sunrise "6
Between the Civil War and the latter part of the century, both federal
and state courts with little difficulty found that legislative delegation of
such functions was consistent with the basic tenet of a republican form of
government: that the people, through elected representatives, should
frame the laws governing their relations with the government and with
one another. It was felt that questions properly legislative, involving
matters about which public opinion should be expressed, were fully deter-
mined when the affair was turned over to administrators. If discretion
were granted, it was only in the discernment of facts still contingent at
the time the legislature acted, the mere determination of which by the
agency would invoke a prepared legislative response. For example, Con-
gress might leave to the executive branch the power of imposing a
predetermined tariff on several named products, if the exporting coun-
tries should impose on American products "reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable" duties.7 Administrative freedom was also allowed in fill-
ing the interstices of a law which otherwise spoke to all matters impor-
tant enough to be of popular concern. There was no delegation of
legislative power in leaving to the Supreme Court the administrative
task of determining "the forms of writs, executions, and other process,
and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits."' A variant of this sec-
ond justification was that the legislature had prescribed a standard suffi-
'T. Lowi. THE END OF LIBERALISM 128 (1969). L.D. Wii'rrE. THE FEDERALISTS (1978).
The grants of such powers by state legislatures were almost uniformly upheld as proper delega-
tions. See. e.g., People v. Brooks, 101 Mich. 98, 59 N.W 444 (1894) (fishing permit); In re
Kingman, 153 Mass. 566, 27 N.E. 778 (1891) (assessments); Schwab v. Grant, 126 N.Y. 473, 27
N.E. 964 (1891 (auctioneer s license): State v. Hememann, 80 Wis. 253. 49 N.W 818 (1891)
(pharmaceutical license); Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 9 S.E. 686 (1889) (rmn-
ing license); Hildreth v. Crawford, 65 Iowa 339, 21 N.W 667 (1884) (pharmaceutical license); In
re Roberts, 17 Hun. 559 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1879) (assessments): People v. Harper, 91 In. 357 (1878}
(inspection law); Polinsky v People, 73 N.Y 65 (1878) (sanitary code): Cooper v. Schultz, 32
How. Pr. 107 (N.Y.C.P 1866) (sanitary code).
'Cooper v. Schultz, 32 How. Pr. 107. 107-08 (N.Y.C.P 1866).7Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (McKinley tariff). Cf In re Kingman, 153 Mass. 566,
27 N.E. 778 (1891) (sewage plant assessments); People v. Dunn, 80 Cal. 211, 22 Pac. 140 (1889)
(selection of building site).
'Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 31 (1825). See also Hurst v. Warner. 102 Mich.
238, 60 N.W 440 (1894) (sanitary regulations). But see L. JAFFE & N. NArHANSON, Al)-
M INIgrIIATiVE LAw 87 (1968): Jaffe. An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 CoDiuM. L.
REv. 359, 561, 581-92 (1947).
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ciently definite to confine administrative action within narrow bounds.'
State and Federal Regulatory Commisszons
With the appearance of the first independent regulatory commissions
during the latter half of the last century, one might expect to find a reap-
praisal of the delegation question in the courts. The new species of agen-
cy exercised powers far in excess of those formerly granted and theories
which until that time had validated the practice of legislative abdication
simultaneously became strikingly inadequate. It might thus seem
curious that the judiciary of the progressive era was so little troubled by
the delegation issue. The reason is not simply that it was expedient to
defer to a bureaucracy made necessary by changed conditions; nor would
it be accurate to suppose that ideas about agency expertise or interest-
group liberalism affected the courts' response. Those notions belong to a
later period.
The regulatory commission appeared on the state level after the Civil
War, as a response to problems created by the first instance of powerful
economic concentration, the railroads. Vexing difficulties appeared as the
railroads carried and supplied settlers of the central and western states.
Tracks were laid across areas which never became populous enough to
sustain service, and the railroads were able to pass on their costs in the
form of high rates to users.'0 One of the objectives of the Granger move-
ment was the establishment of strong commissions with powers to fix
maximum rates," and to prosecute violations of regulatory legislation.'
2
By 1887 ten states had taken such action.'3 In response to less extreme
problems the eastern states established commissions whose powers were
mainly advisory- to report to the legislature on compliance with charters,
inspect roads, investigate accidents, and examine accounts.'4
The impulse behind enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act arose
from several sources. It was widely acknowledged by those concerned to
contain the power of the railroads that state regulation was ill-conceived
and ineffective.' 5 Moreover, the railroads themselves had an interest in
nationally uniform and predictable regulation, which might have the ad-
ditional benefit of neutralizing the fierce competition that made their ex-
istence so hazardous.' 6 Legislation was well underway 7 when the
'See. e.g.. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470,496 (1904) United States v. Gnmaud, 220 U.S.
506, 522 (1911): (legislation gave a "primary standard").
"CuSIIMAN at 25.
"In most cases the rates established by such commissions would be only prima facie reasonable,
and were subject to challenge m judicial proceedings. Id at 27. But see Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466 (1898), striking down a Nebraska statute which made a rate set by the legislature or commis-
sion conclusive upon the courts.
12CuSIIMAN. supra note 1. at 27.
"Id at 26.
"Id at 22-23; C.F ADAMS. RAH.ROADS: THEIR ORIGIN AND PROBLEMS 137 (1878).
"'See I. TARBEI,. THE NATIONALIZING OF BUSINESS 97-98 (1936): CUSHMAN. supra note 1, at 34:
1 I.L. SHARFMAN. THE INTERSTA'rE COMMERCE COMMISSION 17-19 (1931).




Supreme Court declared that regulation of interstate railroad transporta-
tion was a matter of strictly federal concern, even as to portions of a trip
strictly within state lines. 8
The Interstate Commerce Act as originally enacted in 188719 attemp-
ted chiefly to prevent excessive charges and discriminatory practices. To
control rates, section one declared that all charges should be just and
reasonable, and section five forbade agreements to divide up traffic or
revenues. To prevent discrimnation, sections two and three in general
prescribed equal charges for like services, and section four forbade
greater aggregate charges for shorter hauls. The Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) was also given publicity and investigatory powers.20
Commission orders were enforceable only on its or an interested party's
application to the courts, where Commission findings of fact were to be
accepted as prima facie evidence.2'
Although the challenge was soon made on the state level that a grant of
rate-making power was a legislative abdication, the courts uniformly re-
jected such claims. The doctrinal justifications were the same as had
been advanced to support the much more restrained grants of powers in
the earlier cases. An instructive example is Minnesota ex rel. Railroad &
Warehouse Commission v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.22
The statute establishing the Minnesota commission provided it with the
power to declare "reasonable and equal" rates, enforceable by an action
of mandamus, 23 in which the rates set by the commission were conclusive-
ly presumed to be reasonable. 24 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the
statute under the state constitution. The court found that delegation of a
legislative power was permissible in several situations. Discretion could
be exercised by an administrative agency in the determination of facts to
which would be applied legislatively prescribed standards. An example
similar to the fixing of railroad rates was the assessment of property
values. Some discretion might also be exercised in filling in the in-
terstices of a statute by the body charged with its execution.2 5 Thus the
Railroad & Warehouse Commission would have a power to enact rules
and regulations defining "ample, equal, and reasonable facilities for trade
and travel" akin to the power possessed by courts to prescribe rules of
procedure under a general enabling act.2 6
"Wabash, St.L. & P.R.R. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
"
9Act of 4 Feb. 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
2°Act of 4 Feb. 1887, ch. 104, §§ 12, 13, 24 Stat. 383-84.
"Act of 4 Feb. 1887, ch. 104, § 16, 24 Stat. 384-85.
2238 Minn. 281, 37 N.W 782 (1888), rev'd on other grounds, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
"Act of 7 March 1887, ch. 10 § 8(e)-(g), 1887 Minn. Gen. Laws 49.
1'38 Minn. at 294-95, 37 N.W at 784.
11Id. at 299-300, 37 N.W at 787.
161. at 291,300, 37 N.W at 782-83, 787. Cf. Cincinnati, W & Z. R.R. v. Comm'rs. of Clinton
Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852) ("The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferred authority or discre-
tion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.")
Challenges of improper delegation made against state railroad commissions' power to set rates
which would be accepted prima facie as reasonable were rejected in a number of other states, on
[Vol. 54:45
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The attitude of the United States Supreme Court was similar. At least
until the passage of the Hepburn Act in 1906,27 the Court seemed unwill-
ing to recognize a grant of substantial power to the Interstate Commerce
Commission.28 But the Court's reluctance to admit that real rule-making
power had been granted did not stem from a conviction that it was not
within Congress's authority to do so. In 1910 the Interstate Commerce
Act was amended to require application to the ICC in all cases in which
grounds similar to those cited in Chicago, Milwaukee & St Pau and in Cincinnat4 Wilmington
and Zanesville. See, e.g., Board of Transp. v. Fremont, E. & M.V R.R., 22 Neb. 313, 35 N.W
118 (1887); Chicago, Burlington & Qumcy R.R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Il. 361, 35 N.E. 246 (1894);
McWhorter v. Pensacola & Atl. R.R., 24 Fla. 417, 5 S. 129 (1888); Storrs v. Pensacola & Atl.
R.R., 29 Fla. 617, 11 S. 226 (1892); Tilley v. Savannah, Fla. & W R.R., 5 F 641 (C.C.S.D. Ga.
1881).
(Ct. App. 1877) (determination of route for city transit system); Portland & Oxford Central R.R. v.
The Grand Trunk Ry., 46 Me. 69 (1858) (determination of contract terms for connecting
railroads).
Besides the railroad commission, the most common type of state regulatory agency in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the insurance commission, whose function was to con-
trol the issuance and terms of insurance policies. Between 1895 and 1905 courts in five states
declared unconstitutional the delegation to a commission of the power to write a standard policy.
O'Neil v. American Fire Ins. Co., 166 Pa. 74, 30 A. 945 (1895); Anderson v. Manchester Fire
Assurance Co., 59 Minn. 182, 63 N.W. 241 (1895); Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65
N.W. 738 (1896); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 19 S.D. 59, 101 N.W 1110 (1905); King v. Concor-
dia Fire Ins. Co., 140 Mich. 258, 103 N.W 616 (1905). It is, however, difficult to avoid the re-
ference that these cases rested on no more than a feeling that "Sometimes (to reverse Dean Pound's
comment) the commonwealth must suffer for John Doe's sake." D. PATTERSON. THE INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 253-54 & n.49 (1927). In all of these cases but King-where
both plaintiff and defendant argued that the legislation was unconstitutional-the invalidation of
the delegation resulted in the insured's recovery. Frequently the decision rested on the flimsiest of
grounds. Thus, the Anderson court found a possibility for unbridled discretion under a statute
which provided that the commission should adopt a policy conforming to the one then in force in
New York. In the other cases one is left with the suspicion that the court was merely dissatisfied
with the terms of the policy adopted by the insurance commsion. Thus the court in O'Neill said of
the standard contract "'It seems to be framed m the interest of dishonest companies and insurance
brokers...'[, thus] showing the impolicy of such delegation of legislative power as might make it
possible to fasten upon the people of the commonwealth a form of contract, open to such grave ob-
jections." 166 Pa. at 74, 30 A. at 945. At any rate the pattern of decisions was quickly reversed.
See, ag., Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472,220 N.W 929 (1928) (overrul-
ingDowling); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); Martin v. Howard, 96
Neb. 278, 147 N.W 689 (1914); PATTERSON. supra, at 255-56.
"Act of 29 June 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584.
28See 1 I.L. SHARFMAN. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 25-35, 38-40 (1931); I.
TARBELL. THE NATIONALIZING OF BUSINESS 105 (1936); G. KOLKO. RAILROADS AND REGULATION:
1877-1916, at 80-86 (1965); H. FAULKNER. POLITICS. REFORM AND EXPANSION 78-79 (1959).
In ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry., 167 U.S. 479 (1897) (the Maximum Rate Case)
overturning the ICC's action in setting a schedule of rates for a number of carriers over several
routes, the Court showed an extreme reluctance to infer a grant of rate-making power, absent ex-
plicit statutory directions. 167 U.S. at 505-06. The decision rested in part on a lack of conviction as
to the competence of the ICC to perform legislative tasks. Id The Court referred to the enormity of
the job of prescribing rates for the thousands of roads and products, cl at 505, and concluded that,
subject to the prohibition of discrimination and of unreasonable rates,
"the act to regulate commerce leaves common carriers as they were at common law,
free to make special contracts looking to the increase of their business, to classify
their traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of com-
merce, and generally to manage their important interests upon the same principles
which are regarded as sound, and adopted m other trades and pursuits."
Id at 493, quoting ICC v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 43 F 37, 50-51 (1890). See also Cincinnati, N.O.
& Tex. Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184 (1896) (denying grant of rate-making power).
19781
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railroads wished to be exempted from the long and short haul provision.2 9
In the Intermountain Rate Cases ° seventeen carriers applied for exemp-
tions covering most of the United States, alleging competition by water
carriers and Canadian railroads as circumstances justifying exceptional
treatment. The ICC denied in large part the application, allowing percen-
tage variations in rates for travel from some zones to others. The Court
denied that any legislative power had improperly been delegated to or ex-
ercised by the ICC. Its authority to grant an exemption was made "to de-
pend upon the facts established and the judgment of the body in the exer-
cise of a sound legal discretion "3' That discretion was sufficiently
restrained by the standards laid down in sections two and three of the
act, forbidding undue preferences and discrimination.32
Despite the language of "determimng facts," or "filling in interstices,"
or "acting under standards," however, the standards under which the
regulatory commissions acted were vague, and their powers were far
greater than what earlier had been granted. It is unlikely that the Min-
nesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission was much enlightened by
the statutory command that rates be "reasonable and equal," or that ex-
emption from the long and short haul provision was a more certain affair
because the ICC was charged with stamping out undue preferences and
discrimination.33 Moreover, the far-reaching influence of the railroad com-
The same year the Maximum Rate Case was decided, the Court made another significant incur-
sion on the ICC's power. In ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897), the Commission
was shorn of its power to determine exceptions to § 4 of the Act, providing that railroads should not
charge more for a short than for a long haul "under substantially similar circumstances and condi-
tions." Act of 4 Feb. 1887, ch. 104, § 4. 24 Stat. 380. The Court declared that railroads need not
apply to the ICC for exemption, since no violation would exist even in the absence of permission, if
circumstances were not substantially similar. Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated that the ICC had
"been shorn, by judicial interpretation, of authority to do anything of an effective character." 168
U.S. at 176.
'Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309,36 Stat. 539, 547. The change was effected by deleting the phrase
"substantially similar circumstances and conditions," the determination of which ICC v. Alabama
Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897), held could be made by carriers without prior ICC approval. See
note 28 supra.
3"234 U.S. 476 (1914).
"Id. at 485-86.
32Id at 487-88. See also St. Louis & Iron Mtn. & S. Ry v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908) (rejec-
ting, on the authority of the Intermountain Rate Cases, the argument that the ICC was improperly
delegated power to determine the height of draw bars).
A similar position was taken by the Supreme Court in other areas of econormc regulation. For ex-
ample, the Tea Inspection Act of 2 March 1897, ch. 358, 29 Stat. 604, 605, provided that a board
should give uniform standards of "purity, quality, and fitness for consumption" of imported teas.
The Court rejected a challenge to the delegation of such power, holding that "Congress legislated
on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was com-
pelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the
statute." Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904). In Union Bridge Co. v. United States,
204 U.S. 364 (1907), the Court sustained the Secretary of War s power to order changes in the
structure of a bridge which he determined to be an "unreasonable obstruction to free navigation."
River and Harbor Act of 3 March 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1153. Congress rmght, it held, pro-
perly delegate the power "to determine some fact or state of things upon which the enforcement of
its enactment depends " 204 U.S. at 387.
3 3But see T. Lowi. THi- END OF LIBERAISNI 131 (1969), arguing that by comparison with later
grants of power to federal regulatory commssions, the language of the Interstate Commerce Act
was at least "freighted with meaning."
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missions, over both individual fortunes and community progress,
multiplied by the same factor the significance of agency
decision-making.34
To some extent, the courts' application of outmoded justifications to
the new regulatory agencies may simply reflect judicial awareness of the
need for regulation which traditional democratic institutions like the
legislatures could not provide.3 5 One finds repeated references to the need
for a body, unlike the legislature, which would be continually in session to
cope with the unpredictable circumstances which might necessitate a
rate change.3 6 To set rates for the great number of routes would also re-
quire an expenditure of time which even a legislature constantly in ses-
sion could put to more profitable use.3 7 But a thoroughgoing belief in the
division of powers among the holy trinity of mneteenth century institu-
tions could have overcome greater difficulties than these. If acceptable
regulation could only be secured by the legislative process of committee
consideration, hearings, debate, partisan criticism and public voting,
then the legislature might have been expanded to a size adequate to deal
with the problems facing it. If the exercise of the franchise over
legislative decision-makers were really a safeguard against arbitrary ac-
tion, it would have been possible to arrange for the popular election of
commissioners.
It would be anachronistic, moreover, to impute to the judiciary of the
progressive era accceptance of several justifications later advanced for
the delegation of power to regulatory agencies. Nobody then voiced the
rationale subsequently developed by interest-group liberalism: that
agency decision-making was acceptable because it was scrutinized and in-
fluenced by those most closely concerned.38 Although the turn of the cen-
tury witnessed the birth of politically important umons and professional
orgamzations, their influence was only beginmng to be felt, even at the
polls. 39 Nor did the courts think that the expertise of regulatory agencies
qualified them to act in areas where the legislature was not competent.
While Wilson suggested that notion as early as 1887, 0 it was not ac-
"'Gabriel Kolko has persuasively argued that there was little serious objection made by railroads
to the powers delegated to and exercised by the ICC. G. KOLKO. RAILROADS AND REGULATION:
1877-1916 (1965). There was, however, a public sector affected in great measure, and perhaps
adversely, by the same measures in which carriers acquiesced.
35See L. FREIDMAN. A HISTiOaRy OF AMERICAN LAW 385-86 (1973). It is suggested that the ques-
tion of an improper delegation of power to the state railroad commissions has never been seriously
posed. CUSHMAN. supra note 1, at 31.
•'See. e.g., Chicago & N.W Ry. v. Dey, 35 F 866, 875 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888); Chicago, Burl-
ington & Quincy R.R. v. Jones, 149 Il. 361, 37 N.E. 247, 251 (1894).
3 See, e.g., Tilley v. Savannah, Fla. & W R.R., 5 F 641, 656-57 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1881):
McWhorter v. Pensacola & AtI. R.R., 24 Fla. 417, 472-74, 5 S. 129, 136-37 (1888).
"See, for example, the argument advanced by the government m A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935). For a more recent and complete statement of thus
same thesis, see Jaffe, The Illusion of the IdealAdministration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183 (1973). See
also the criticism offered in T. Lowi. THE END OF LIBERALISM 144-56 (1969).
•' R. WIEBE. THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 129 (1967).




cepted by the courts, nor did it flourish in academic circles, until much
later. 4
1
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AGAINST
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The failure of the judiciary at the turn of the century to react skeptical-
ly to the vastly expanded scope of delegation cannot be attributed to sun-
ple unawareness of the political reality The preceding section argued
that a genuine commitment to preserve the integrity of the legislative
process would have led the courts to seek alternatives to the spread of
regulatory agencies. It also suggested that judicial acquiescence cannot
be explained by attributing to the courts a belief in agency expertise or m
the tenets of interest-group liberalism. A more convincing explanation
for the little heed paid to the delegation issue is that by and large the
judiciary, was determined to protect a certain cluster of individual rights,
saw little choice between legislature and agency, and sought to ac-
complish its objective by other means. Acting from such motives, the
Court would have been disingenuous, if not simply irrational, m com-
plaining that an agency was given powers, the proper and beneficial exer-
cise of which could only be properly and beneficially exercised by the
legislature.
If Blackstone had thought that "the public good is in nothing more
essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual's his
private rights," 42 the United States Supreme Court's position even as
late as 1923 was scarcely distinguishable:
To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by
the Constitution, is not to strike down the common good but to
exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole cannot be bet-
ter served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint
of the liberties of its constituent members.43
The protection of the individual envisioned by the Court consisted in
securing to him a maximum of freedom to act with regard to his property
and his contractual relations. 44 Freedom of action in those respects
demanded defense against two constraimng forces. On the one hand, it
could be enjoyed only if governmental interference were confined to a
nmmum. Thus the Income Tax Act of 1894, 45 which would have levied
"For a mature statement of this position, see J. LANDIS. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-28,
96-98, 141-49 (1938) A good example of reliance on this notion by the Supreme Court can be seen m
Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). There the Court enunciated
the "end result" rule: "If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and
unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed to
reach the result may contain infirmities is not then important." Id. at 602.
41i W B.LACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 139 (1807).
'
3Adkns v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923). Cf G. KOLKO. RAILROADS AND
REGULATIONS: 1877-1916, at81 (1965); Pound, Justice According to Law, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
18-20 (1914).
"R. WIEBE. THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 81-82, 92-93 (1967).
5Act of 27 Aug. 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
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upon profits from real estate and personalty, was invalidated as an
"assault on capital. '46 The right to income, subject in the case of railroad
and public utility rates to legislative and administrative interference,
was shielded by the due process clause.47 Freedom of contract took on a
new constitutional dimension as maximum hour and mimmum wage
legislation also fell before the due process clause.48 And the "rule of
reason" by which the Standard Oil case construed the Sherman Act made
clear that combinations were not to be condemned for their size alone, as
long as they did not unduly restrain commerce, and were arrived at by
"normal methods of industrial development." 49 "[Tihe freedom of the in-
dividual right to contract, when not unduly or improperly exercised," the
Court postulated, "was the most efficient means for the prevention of
monopoly "50
It should not be supposed, however, that the Court was only interested
in the protection of big business. For the individual's property and con-
tractual rights also demanded protection against constraint by private
concentrations of power and wealth, or at least against those not arrived
at by skill, foresight, and industry In dissolving the Northern Securities
Company, for example, the Court specified that "liberty of contract did
not involve a right to deprive the public of the advantages of free com-
petition in trade and commerce."'"
The effort made by the Supreme Court during the progressive era to
preserve this individual freedom of action took several related forms in
the area of adminimstrative law. Those forms, though, had their cognates
in the Court's treatment of strictly legislative action. The striking
similarity in attitude toward action by regulatory agency and legislature
suggests a conviction that both posed the same threat to individual liber-
ty It follows that control of admnistrative action was to be sought, not
by remanding non-delegable powers to the legislature, but by interposing
the judicial shield between individual and agency
The Dotnne of Non-Finality
Most notable among the judicial efforts to secure individual freedom of
action was the argument that adminimstrative fact-finding and decision-
"Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,607 (opinion of Field, J.), affd on rehear-
iag, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Any such tax, the Court held, was "direct" within the meaning of Article
I, § 9, and had to be apportioned among the states m order to prevent harsh treatment of the
smaller states at the whim of the majority. If not, the boundary between nation and states would
disappear, "and with it one of the bulwarks of private rights and private property." 157 U.S. at
583.
"See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
4"See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum hours for bakers); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage for women).
"Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911).
0Id at 62.
"Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351 (1904) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Cf
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (declaring illegal the division of
markets and price fixing); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897)
(holding unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act restraints of trade permitted at common law).
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making could not be final, that interpretation of the constitution and of
statutes was ultimately the proper task of the judicial branch of govern-
ment. The problem was presented most sharply by statutes providing
that an agency determination that conduct fell within a prescribed stan-
dard should be conclusive and, consequently, that the sole remaining
function for the courts was enforcement simplictter However, legislative
action could and did make similarly unsuccessful claims to finality A law
prescribing uniform and fixed rates for carriers of specified com-
modities5 2 differed in no important respect from a determination by com-
mission that a rate of X dollars per mile was a maximum reasonable fare
for railroad Y carrying product Z. The judicial response to both situa-
tions was a rigid categorization of governmental action as either
"legislative" or "judicial." Action of the former sort, rules to which
private action had to conform, laid down in advance by either legislature
or agency, was always subject to judicial scrutiny before it could be final-
ly effective. 53
In Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota,54 the Court
reviewed a Minnesota statute making conclusive the determination of
the state Railroad & Warehouse Commission that a published rate was
not "reasonable and equal," and the setting by the commission of a
reasonable rate. The commission had fixed a charge for the transporta-
tion of milk by the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul which the railroad
refused to acknowledge, and had applied for mandamus to enforce its
order. The Court quashed the issuance of mandamus, holding that due
process and equal protection required a judicial investigation of the
reasonableness of rates set by the commission.
The Court's due process argument had a peculiarly modern ring. It
pointed out that the commission had none of the "machinery of a court of
justice."55 It needed only to' "find" a published rate unreasonable, and
was required to provide no hearing, notice, or opportunity to introduce
witnesses.56 That the insufficiency of the required procedure was not the
"Act of 12 April 1893, ch. 24, 1893 Neb. Laws (held unconstitutional in Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898)).
"The discussion which follows considers only those administrative actions which determined
future conduct, and which the courts considered to be "legislative" in character. Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (rate-making a legislative action). It thus excludes from
discussion administrative action in cases like reparation suits, see, e.g., ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. &
Tex. Pac. Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 499 (the Maximum Rate Case) (1897) (reparation suit judicial in
character), and workmen s compensation, see, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). It
should be noted, however, that the doctrine of non-finality of administrative action was applied by
the courts with equal vigor to agency determinations of the latter sort. See Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932) (trial de novo of admnistrative award of workmen's compensation). In general it
may be said that the right to judicial review was asserted whenever action was taken directly and
conclusively affecting individual rights by the application of a standard to a specific case. Cf Cur-
tis, Judicial Review of Commission Rate Regulation-The Ohio Valley Case, 34 HA Rv. L. REV.
862, 877-78 (1921). Nevertheless, it was felt that there were special reasons requiring such review in
the case of administrative orders determinative of future conduct. See infra, p. 17.
"'134 U.S. 418 (1890), rev g 38 Minn. 281, 37 N.W 782 (1888).
51134 U.S. at 457561d.
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only fatal infirmity of the statute was, however, clear. For the Court also
declared that the railroad was deprived of equal protection insofar as it
was demed the opportunity to make a reasonable profit, while other car-
rers were not so treated. 7
It soon became evident that the due process clause, apparently
restricted by the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul case to matters purely
procedural, offered business corporations the same substantive
safeguard as did equal protection. In Smyth v. Ames 8 the Court in-
validated a Nebraska act fixing a schedule of maximum freight rates, and
giving the state board of transportation the power to amend the rate for
any commodity on two weeks' notice. The Court found that state action
which set rates unreasonably low contravened the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 59 In defimng the factors which made for
reasonable compensation, the Smyth Court stated that "[ulndoubtedly
that question could be more easily determined by a commission com-
posed of persons whose special skill, observation and experience qualifies
them . But. the court cannot shrink from the duty to determine
whether., the Nebraska statute invades or destroys rights secured by
the supreme law of the land. 6 0 To allow the statutory schedule to
preclude the courts would make the legislature, and not the courts, the
final judge of constitutionality 61
It is difficult to imagine that if, as the Court admits, the commission
could better judge the reasonableness of a rate, it could not also better
measure the same rate against a constitutional standard of confiscation,
however defined.62 The Court's overturning of rates set by an admittedly
T Id. at 458.
1169 U.S. 466 (1898).
59Id at 526, 546-47. The Court also found that such state action ran afoul of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 526.
"°Id at 527.
"Id. at 527-28. Because of the provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, as originally
enacted, that the Commissions's report was only to be "prima facie evidence of the matters
therein stated, "Act of 4 Feb. 1887, ch. 104, § 16, 24 Stat. 385, the courts during the first
two decades of the Commission's existence refused to grant any sort of finality to Commis-
sion orders. 2 I.L. SHARFMAN. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 385-87 (1931). This
refusal resulted in the frequent grant of a de novo hearing. See, e.g. Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 239 (1896); ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144, 174-75 (1897).
"Justice Harlan's statement that the finality of legislative or of agency action "is in op-
position to the theory of our institutions," 169 U.S. at 527, suggests that the assertion of
judicial finality may have rested simply on the notion of judicial supremacy sometimes
read into Marbury v. Madison: that the courts should be the final arbitors of constitutional
questions. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a recent example of that expansive reading of
Marbury, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974). See generally G. GUNTHER.
CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW 25-36 (9th ed. 1975).
Such a suggestion passes over a number of unsettled questions. In the first place it was
by no means clear, at least in 1898, that the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment were intended to protect corporations, and not simply individuals,
against state action. See 2 C. & M. BEARD. RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 111-14 (1927);
FREUND. ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 30-34 (1949); Graham, The "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment 47 YALE L.J. 371-75 (1938); Mendelson, Mr.
Justice Black and the Rule of Law, 4 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 250, 251 (1960); Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949)(Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85-90 (1938)(Black, J., dissenting). It was not
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competent legislature and agency reveals an attitude significant in its
bearing on the doctrine of the non-finality of agency action: the convic-
tion of an essential difference between legislative and judicial action. In
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.63 the Court found that it might proper-
ly enjoin the Virginia Corporation Commission from attempting to en-
force an order fixing railroad passenger rates, despite a statute forbid-
ding United States courts to intervene in proceedings in "any court of a
state.' '64 The application of the statute, it declared, was confined to
bodies whose actions were judicial in nature, that is, which were concern-
ed with declaring and enforcing liabilities arising from present or past
facts and existing laws. The setting of rates, however, because it was con-
cerned with makmg rules for the future, was legislative in nature.65
A similar recognition attended and strongly influenced the grant of
powers to the Interstate Commerce Commission. In ICC v. Cincinnati,
New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway,66 the Court invalidated the Com-
mission's action in setting maximum rates for several carriers between
Cincinnati, Chicago, and a number of other cities. The Court began by
stating, "It is one thing to inquire whether the rates which have been
charged and collected are reasonable--that is a judicial act; but an entirely
different thing to prescribe rates which shall be charged m the future-
that is a legislative act.' '6 7 It then read the Interstate Commerce Act's
command that the Commission should "execute and enforce the provi-
sions of this act" 68 as granting much tamer powers, "partly judicial, part-
ly executive and administrative, but not legislative. ' 69 The Act was soon
thereafter amended explicitly to grant the ICC ratemaking powers.7 0 But
until 1886 that the Court first applied the equal protection clause to corporations, Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), thus extending its reach
beyond racial discrimination, to which it had been limited by the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). And it was not until three years thereafter that the due process
clause was similarly expanded. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
Moreover, even if the due process clause were to cover corporations, it was not certain at
the time Smyth was decided that it was meant to apply to more than procedure. R. WIEBE.
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 82 (1967). Furthermore, there was no indication that what it com-
manded must be judicial procedure. See Chicago, M. & St. P Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S.
418, 463-64 (1890)(Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative process is due process).
Finally, to claim baldly as did the Court in both Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. at 526, and
Chicago, M. & St. P., 134 U.S. at 458, that there was a violation of equal protection in deny-
ing a judicially determined reasonable return to one carrier while allowing it to others is to
raise to constitutional status every allegation of uneven-handed governmental treatment.63211 U.S. 210 (1908).
"
4Act of 2 Mar. 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334 (codified in U.S. Rev. Stat. § 720 (1873-74)).
The Court assumed that the commission was a court within the meaning of the stautue.
211 U.S. at 224.
6211 U.S. at 226. See also Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428, 440 (1923);
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1913); ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex.
Pac. Ry., (the Maximum Rate Case) 167 U.S. 479, 499 (1897).
66167 U.S. 479 (1897). Cf Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184 (1896).
6167 U.S. at 499.
61Act of 4 Feb. 1887, ch. 104, § 12, 24 Stat. 383, as amended by Act of 2 March 1889, ch.
382, § 4, 25 Stat. 858.
69167 U.S. at 500-01.
'"Act of 29 June 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584.
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recogmzing the Court's obvious hostility toward any assertion of the
finality of "legislative" action, and fearing that the amendment would
otherwise be found unconstitutional, the Hepburn Act explicitly pro-
vided that any rates set by the Commission would only be prima facie
reasonable, and not conclusive upon the courts.71
The use of the term "legislative" to describe agency ratemaking
evinces an awareness on the part of the Court of the essential similarity
of the action of ratemaking whether exercised by an agency, as in
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Pau4 or by the legislature, as in Smyth v.
Ames. There is no pretense of calling such action administrative, for the
power and the discretion involved are evidently the sort which formerly
had been lodged solely in legislatures. Indeed, it was pointed out at the
time that the Court's recognition of this similarity rendered incom-
prehensible the assertion that legislative power had been delegated pro-
perly to a regulatory agency.7
2
The argument that legislative action could not be final because it laid
down rules in advance of action is quite different from the interpretation
sometimes given Marbury v. Madison: that the courts should be the
ultimate expositors of the constitution. The latter rests, at least with
regard to the federal courts, on the constitutional commands that "(t)he
judicial power shall extend to all Cases ... arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties," and that the Constitu-
tion and laws "made in pursuance thereof" shall be the supreme law of
the land,73 and on the consequent demand that consistency makes on the
courts to measure laws against the constitution.74 The distinction be-
tween legislative and judicial action, on the other hand, arose from the
puritan view, still strongly persisting, of man as a free moral agent, with
a power to choose what to do, and a responsibility coincident with that
power. Law, while it was desirable, indeed necessary, as a guide to in-
dividual action, was not to be a coercive authority Civil consequences,
like supernatural ones, should follow upon action, not determine it m ad-
vance.
71
Definition of the Constitutional Limits of
Administrative and Legislative Action
That administrative action was coercive in advance of individual action
was not, however, the Court's sole objection to the regulatory agency In
"Act of 29 June 1906, ch. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 590. See J. BLUM, THE REPUBLICAN
ROOSEVELT 96-97 (1962).
"Harriman, Administrative Control of Corporations, 6 PROC. AMER. POL. SCI. ASS'N 33,
39 (1909).
"U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; art. VI, cl. 2.
"15 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-79 (1803).
"Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM L. REV. 1, 23 (1914); See Pound,
Puritanism and the Common Law, 45 AMER. L. REV. 811 (1911).
The judicial doctrine of non-finality was not without its effect m the political arena. It
evoked at least two responses worthy of note. The first was proposals for the popular
review of judicial decisions, by methods other than constitutional amendment. See, e.g., W
RANSOM, MAJORITY RULE AND THE JUDICIARY (1912). The second was the recall of judges.
See, e.g., C. MCCARTHY. THE WISCONSIN IDEA. 268-69 (1912).
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addition to the doctrine of non-finality, the Court's effort to preserve in-
dividual freedom of action took form in the notion that regulatory action
should be confined within narrow and well-defined bounds. Judicial over-
sight was necessary to constram agency action, not only because the lat-
ter might chill in advance the exercise of individual rights, but also
because, being rule of government and not of law, it might be both
overzealous and arbitrary That this judicial oversight is as evident in the
Court's response to legislative action strictly defined as it is in the con-
straints imposed on regulatory agencies demonstrates again the reason
why the Court of the progressive era was unconcerned with the signifi-
cant legislative powers then and shortly thereafter delegated to such
agencies as the ICC, and FTC, and the Federal Reserve Board. For the
majoritanan excesses which the Court was concerned to control were as
apparent in legislative action properly so-called as they were in ad-
ministrative action. And a remand of power to such a legislature would
have done little to curb a danger the Court saw posed from both quarters
alike.
The attempt to restrict regulation in the admnistrative arena took
shape in the notion of the rule of law; with respect to legislative action it
took the form of substantive due process. Both proceeded under the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the former to
safeguard private property dedicated to the public use by railroads and
public utilities, the latter primarily to preserve against legislative in-
terference the contractual relations between private citizens. The social
darwinism evident in these protective judicial efforts found its
theoretical justification in a notion that resolution of constitutional ques-
tions was a task for which judges were peculiarly capable.
Administrative Action--The Rule of Law
The right of the states to limit the return a railroad might get for its
service was recognized in 1877 76as the natural concomitant of a monopo
ly position achieved in large measure through state assistance.7 That
rates could not be fixed too low was, however, quickly asserted. In
Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 8 while sustaining rates set by a
state railroad commission, the Court noted:
This, as has been often observed, is a government of law, and
not a government of men, and it must never be forgotten that
under such a government, with its constitutional limitations
and guarantees, the forms of law and the machinery of govern-
ment, with all their reach and power, must in their actual work-
ings stop on the hither side of unnecessary and uncompensated
"
6Munn v. Illinois. 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 113 (1877).
"I& at 126-33. See C. GOODRICH. GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND
RAILROADS. 1800-1890, at 268-71 (1960).
78154 U.S. 362 (1894).
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taking or destruction of any private property, legally acquired
and legally held.79
In Smyth v. Ames stockholders of the Union Pacific Railroad sued to
enjoin the railroad from reducing its charges under a Nebraska statute
setting maximum freight rates 0 They also sought to restrain the state
board of transportation from exercising its power to lower the rate on any
commodity. The Supreme Court upheld a Circuit Court injunction, find-
ding in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause a prohibition
against state action fixing rates so low as to take private property
without reasonable compensation."'
Although the due process clause gave little guidance,82 the Court tried
to specify the elements to be considered in the ascertainment of a con-
fiscatory rate. A railroad, it declared, was entitled to a fair return on the
fair value of the property and services it committed to public use. The
determination of fair value required a consideration of original cost, im-
provements, the value of the road's stock, reproduction cost, operating
expenses, and other factors.8 3 What weight was to be given to any of
these elements was not made clear. Subsequent cases involving state
public utility commissions attempted, with conflicting results, to specify
the relation among the elements which were to be considered in making
up the rate base.84
The doctrine that the rate-making orders of the ICC had to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence, coupled with the Act's provision that
such orders would only be prima facie reasonable, rendered unnecessary
in most cases the resort to constitutional grounds for invalidation of ICC
orders."' For example, in Florida East Coast Line v. United States,8 6 the
Commission order establishing rates on vegetables and citrus fruits
shipped from Florida to consumption points outside the state was struck
down. "[W]here it is contended that an order whose enforcement is
71d at 399
80169 U.S. 466, 470 (1898). Similar suits by other carriers were joined.
"Id at 526. The Court also found a violation of equal protection in the demal of a fair return to
the earners while other carners were permitted to earn such a return. Id According to the Court's
computation, several of the roads actually lost money on local business. Id at 547.
"Inclusion of a just compensation clause in the fourteenth amendment was considered and re-
jected at the time of its enactment. THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 85 (Kendrick ed. 1914).
"1169 U.S. at 546-47. Use of a measure like fair return on capital would have been impracticable
at the time, since the frequency with which stock was watered would have produced greatly inflated
returns. See id at 544-45; G. KOLKO. RAILROADS AND REGUALTION: 1877-1916, at 65-66 (1965).
"See, e.g., Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 450, 472, (1913) (rejecting original cost and
reproduction cost); Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922) (approving historical
cost); S.W Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923) (approving reproduction cost);
Bluefield Water Works v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) (approving reproduction cost);
Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n 262 U.S. 625 (1923) (rejecting reproduction cost);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300 (1929) (use of original cost and book
value); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 278 U.S. 322 (1929) (use of original cost and
book value).
"12 I. SHARFMAN. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 431-39 (1931).
86234 U.S. 167 (1914).
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resisted was rendered without any evidence whatever to support it, the
consideration of such a question involves not an issue of fact, but one of




Nevertheless the Court's perception of its constitutional position vis a
vis the ICC was ultimately identical with that which it asserted in cases
involving state utility cominussions. In St. Louis & O'Fallon Railway v.
United States8  there was overturned a Commission order regarding
valuation of carrier property for purposes of recapture of excess earnings.
By statute the ICC was required to "give due consideratibn to all the
elements of value recognized by the law of the land for rate-making pur-
poses."8 9 What was purportedly a question of statutory interpretation
thus became a constitutional question, to which the Court addressed
itself as it so often had done under the due process clause in the state
commission cases. In light of its holdings in those cases, the Court in-
validated the Commission's determination for failing to give weight to
current reproduction costs, regardless of the probative value of the
evidence adduced to support the estimates of such costs. It was clear that
'IJthe annulment of [the] order though nominally ascribed to a
'mistake of law,' was in effect a substitution of the judgment of the Court
for that of the Commission. '"90
The Court's attempt, in the cases following Smyth v. Ames, to define a
constitutionally required minmum return under the idea of a fair return
on fair value, concealed profound difficulties. In the first place, the fixing
of the rate base and the return were, at bottom, matters of opinion, and
an estimate of the fairness of the rate required as well a prediction as to
earnings under it, and as to the operating expenses which would be in-
curred during the period for which it would be in effect. 91 More important,
the Court's attempted definition of fair value ignored the fact that the
value of the assets was ultimately a function of capitalized earnings,
which themselves depended on the rate which was to be set.
92
The impulse behind the interposition of the due process clause between
public utility and rate-making agency was the desire to set a constitu-
tional limit to the control over the utility which could be exercised in the
public interest. By rephrasing the question of the minimum allowable
return as a question of just compensation,93 the Court denied to
regulatory agencies the freedom to act within a grey area of
reasonableness where the needs of the citizens at large could affect the
"Id at 185. See also Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. United States, 240 U.S. 334 (1916).
88279 U.S. 461 (1929).
"Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, § 422, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
9°2 I. SHARFMAN. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 447 (1931).
"Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 291 (Brandeis, J., con-
curring).
9
'V BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN. CORPORATE FINANCE 378 n.x (1972); FPC v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
"See Chicago, M. & St. P Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418,465 (1890) (Bradley, dissenting); Cf.
Chicago, Burlington & Qumcy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 227, 241-247 (1897) (fourteenth
amendment due process requires just compensation).
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earmngs allowed to a utility. That the delegation of such a power to a
body which had none of the institutional trappings of the legislature was
not the feature which the Court found objectionable finds some support
in the fact that the doctrine of fair return on fair value was first set forth
against legislative action in Smyth v. Ames.
Legislation Action-Substantive Due Process
More convincing proof that the fundamental judicial complaint against
the exercise of legislative powers by regulatory agencies was born of a
desire to shield individual freedom of action against majoritanan ex-
cesses is provided by the simultaneous development of the doctrine of
substantive due process. While the myriad routes and products shipped
by the railroads made rate-makmg a function suitable to be delegated to
an agency, the state legislatures and Congress retained and exercised, in
the form of wage and hour legislation, their traditional power over rela-
tions between private parties. To the effort to shift the burdens of some
private citizens to others the Court responded by trying to define, under
the liberty and property protected by the due process clause, the essence
of freedom of contract. And as was the case with the notion of the rule of
law, the doctrine of substantive due process attempted to control the ef-
fect which considerations of the public welfare had on the decision-
making process of, in this case, the legislature.
Lochner v. New York, 4 for example, concluded that "[s]tatutes
limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn
their living, are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of the in-
dividual. ."95 Other cases attempted to pick out points defining the line
of permissible interference with the freedom of contract.9 6
The Role of the Judiciary
While these judicial efforts at containment of what were seen as
legislative excesses were clearly reacting to changed economic condi-
tions, they were underpinned by assumptions about what was the proper
judicial mode of thought, assumptions which supported, if they did not
entail, thesocial darwinism of the courts. Axiomatic, of course, was the
proposition that the Constitution set out in all necessary detail the limits
94198 U.S. 45 (1905).
"Id at 61.
"See, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 545-552, 554 (1923) (mmunum wage for
women against due process); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11 (1915) (a state statute malngit a
misdemeanor for employer to require employee to execute yellow dog contracts violated the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,421-422 (1908) (approv-
ing ten hour industry day); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 61,172 (1908) (striking down under
the fifth amendment, a federal statute making it a crminal offense for an employer to discharge
employee solely because of union membership); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,370 (1898) (ap-
proving eight hour day for miners); Allgeyer v. Louisana, 165 U.S. 578,591 (1897) (condemning
restrictions in right to contract out of state for insurance).
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within which the American people for whom it was drafted wished to
have their government act. Nor, the theory proceeded, was the meaning
of the document as enacted to be changed other than by the procedures
therein set forth. For, in the words of Justice Story, to which still held the
judicial supremacists of the end of the century-
The only sound principle is to declare, ita lex scnpta est, to
follow, and to obey Nor, if a principle so just and conclusive
could be overlooked, could there well be found a more un-
safe guide in practice, than mere policy and convenience
The constitution is not to be subject to such fluctuations. It is
to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction. It should be
the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.9 7
Upon this Constitution the judiciary was to act in two ways. It had
first of all the job of defining the terms in which were phrased the bounds
of sovereign power and the rights preserved to the people. With well-
defined terms, the law to be applied in any case would then be the result
of rigid deduction according to well-established principles. "In this
development, the rules of construction are plain and easy of application.
It is the function of the courts to determine by logical processes the deci-
sions perdetermined by the law-giver." 98 In this logical system, "the per-
sonality of the judge disappears in the mechanical process of deduction
involved and there results the phenomenon of a 'government of laws and
not of man.' -99
It would be difficult to underestimate the powerful claim to legitimacy
which such an assertion of rationality made. Nevertheless, the pretense
of logic and internal consistency coexisted with an admission that the ex-
ternal element of social policy might have some effect on the judicial
decision-making process. And this latter admission proved to be the
wedge which was ultimately to open up the formal and self-contained
system of judicial thought which sheltered social darwinism in the
courts.
The decision in Smyth v. Ames followed only 21 years upon Munn v. Il-
linots,100 which declared that a public utility's freedom to make any
return it wished was subject to the public interest in the rates, which
would be thereby affected. Moreover, while a utility was entitled con-
stitutionally to a reasonable compensation for its services, the Court
pointed out that the determination of reasonableness was a task for the
legislature, not the courts.10 1 Similarly, the effort of the substantive due
process cases to define and protect liberty of contract never obscured the
admission that liberty of contract might be interfered with by a govern-
ment employing effective means to accomplish legitimate publicly
"I J. STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 426 (1833).
11C. HAINES. THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 501 (1959).
"Id at 502.




necessary ends.10 2 The difficulty with the simultaneous assertion of the
supremacy of a formal judicial mode of thought, however, was that the ef-
fectiveness of a maximum hour law in preserving the health of bakers
was a matter for scientific and sociological study, matters which, it was
ultimately perceived, the judicial branch of the government was ill-
equipped to undertake.
1 1is the standard phrasing of the test for review in the substantive due process cases. See,
e-g., Adkms v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525,546-553 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1,
14(1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,172 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
53-56 (1905). See also the dissent of Chief Justice Hughes in Coppage v. Kansas, arguing that
reasonable men could differ about the effectiveness of the statute there in question, and that conse-
quently it should be upheld. 236 U.S. at 33-35.
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